Essay for Rupp volume

Secularism and the Limits of Community
Jeremy Waldron I "Convictions matter," says George Rupp, whether we share the basis of those convictions or not. People need to say what they really think on issues like globalization, poverty, and social justice, and they need to listen to all the other convictions that are expressed on these matters even if the content and premises of these convictions challenge the secularism that some philosophers prescribe for the exercise of public reason.
I am heartened by Dr. Rupp's argument against prescriptive secularism. I use the term "prescriptive secularism" rather than his term "secular liberalism," because I think there are some who deny that religious convictions have any place in politics who would not describe themselves as liberals, and there are others who call themselves liberals but who have grave misgivings about any prohibition on the use of religious arguments in articulating and defending their liberalism. I number myself among the latter group, and in this essay I would like to 2 explore the idea that liberal views on inequality, social justice, and concern for the poor of the world might prove harder to promote politically if the secularist prescription were adopted. A secular political culture is not necessarily a friendly place for liberalism, at least on the issues I have mentioned. Purged of all trace of the view that there is something sacred in the poorest individual and something blasphemous in our indifference to human need, politics quickly becomes a playground for selfishness: it becomes much more hospitable to selfsatisfied prosperity and self-righteous disdain for those who have not attained prosperity than a political environment ought to be. suggested that the great enemy of religious belief is not skepticism but the silent and pervasive plausibility of a life lived entirely in the glow of material comfort. 2 The converse is also true: material well-bring in a prosperous market economy is always liable to remain lethally indifferent to the ocean of need that surrounds it, unless it is challenged by something that transcends its plausible comforts. that, yet they still recoil (as a community) from the presence of (say) 7 homeless people and they will do everything in their power -including mobilizing the ideology of "community" itself -to ensure that those who are naked, shivering, filthy, unemployed, sick, foreign, and destitute come nowhere near their gates and nowhere near the public places where they walk their prams or hold their barbecues. 5 They will campaign against the establishment of homeless shelters in their vicinity; they will protest about low-income housing if it is likely to impact their property values; they will wrap their children in a cocoon of protective outrage at any attempt to settle sex offenders in their municipality after they have served their sentences; they will campaign to deny to deny state and municipal services to illegal immigrants; they will look askance at those who question their traditions; and on and on. And they will do all this together, as a community, with great sensitivity, solidarity, loyalty, and mutual concern. These are small-scale neighborhood examples, but they have their counterparts too at a national level. Here I have in mind people who bind themselves together in political community to defend their own jobs and industries, no matter what the cost to poor people beyond their borders, who set up a fortress-mentality to deny the benefits of their economy to those they regard as outsiders, and who treat refugees with suspicion rather than compassion.
That I am afraid is the real logic of community in the modern West, and it's a logic that reinforces market exclusion. This comfortable 8 form of community is not antagonistic to the prosperity that a market economy can secure. It depends upon market economy and it will uphold its prosperity against outsiders as the precondition of its own solidarity. It is a form of community that circles the wagons to defend those who are privileged as its members against any concerns beyond the community itself that might threaten the basis of its prosperity. This sort of community is incapable of mitigating the tendency of markets to neglect a whole range of interests.
I know George Rupp used the term "inclusive community" to refer to the kind of thing he had in view, and he did so with the best of motives. He had no intention of associating his argument in these lectures with communities that exclude people or cast people out. But whatever his intent, we cannot take the phrase "inclusive community"
for granted. In the real world, the word "community" is found more commonly in the company of terms like "gated." And this is not surprising. Communitarianism has an inherent "us"/"them" logic, a tendency to define itself by contrast with an "other." Dr. Rupp said at the end of his lectures that he had in mind an inclusive global community, relative to which there would be no "them," no "other." I am with him on that. But the tendency of such inclusiveness is to challenge the very logic of community itself and replace it with the idea of humanity, much as the idea of cosmopolitanism challenges our 9 conventional idea of polity and citizenship and replaces it with something that transcends boundaries and franchises. The principle of Rupp's global community has to be understood in this light: "Nobody is to be left out, not even those whose inclusion tends to unsettle community (in the conventional sense), not even those whose exclusion would make communal goods easier to achieve." In other words, Dr.
Rupp's community is dominated by the principle of humanity, and as such it is quite antithetical to the familiar communitarian idea of humanity having been sorted already into a number of separate and mutually exclusive communities.
What does all this have to do with the debate about secularism?
My hunch is that familiar forms of exclusive community -comfortable neighborhoods of prosperity and solidarity among the well-off -need very little assistance from religious conviction. No doubt, within such groups it is important to motivate people's concern for one another and their concern for the neighborhood, so to speak; it is important to dissuade them from the logic of pure unmitigated self-interest that economists pretend is the building block of market economy. Most of the time, however, very little persuasion is necessary. People are naturally concerned for others who live as they do, especially their fellow-countrymen, and for those who do not already have that concern there is such an evident congruence between prosperity and medium- I said at the beginning that we should not sell short the position of those whose humanity is its own motivation and those who have developed secular theories of social justice that take into account the interests of all humans in the world, not just the members of a given 13 community. 10 That needs to be repeated. Intellectually, cosmopolitan theories of justice can be built on purely secular foundations. Despite the recent turn to communitarianism, the claim that the needs of the stranger, the outcast, and the migrant are entitled to as much consideration as those of the most privileged member of our community is still sometimes heard in moral philosophy and its logic is impeccable. These arguments are worth our consideration; certainly they should not be dismissed out of hand. My own view, however, is that the unease they express is based on a caricature of religious interventions, or on a generalization from a very small and distorted sample.
The secularist view seems to be that a person of faith engaged in a political debate will -if he is allowed -simply cite some verse of scripture which he finds dispositive of the issue and then stand pat, impervious to argument. Not only that but the passage of scripture in question -his "contribution" to the debate -will often be nothing but an aphorism or a commandment, not something in itself that one can engage with or argue with. For example, when an opponent of gay rights quotes a passage from Leviticus -"If a man lies with a male as 16 with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination" 13 -there's not much one can say in response. There doesn't seem to be any point of access here for argument to the effect that homosexual intercourse is not an abomination at all, but actually rather pleasant and loving and fulfilling and valuable. The scripture saith to the contrary, and that seems to be that so far as the biblical fundamentalist is concerned.
That's the sort of thing the prescriptive secularist is worried about. There is a bit about unborn children in Exodus, but it is basic tort liability for injuries to pregnant women, which most pro-choice people are perfectly happy with (apart from its being exploited ideologically by pro-life advocates). 16 I am not saying there is no religious case against abortion, nor am I saying that it has no biblical element. But most commonly it is an argued position, not a biblical one, and the doctrine about (say) the sacred personality or humanity of the foetus is a rationally-made case about something which is presented as an important moral as well as religious idea. 17 Again, I don't mean that is necessarily a compelling piece of argumentation. But argument is what
it is and what it purports to be, and as such it is something that can be engaged with argumentatively in response. One way they may help is by complicating and enriching the normative vocabulary that we use in discussing these matters. In practical deliberation, we don't just present propositions to one another, or evaluate one another's evidence or logic: we try to affect the way things are seen, the connections that are made, the value-language that is used, even the gestalts that are part and parcel of our estimations of the facts we are considering. For example: liberal philosophers and their opponents sometimes argue about whether we have strict or "perfect obligations" to the poor, which is also supposed to be a way of asking whether the poor have rights to our assistance. These juridical terms -"rights" and "obligation" -are the common currency of secular normative discourse. 
